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The Challenges of integrating MK 13 Torpedoes into USN Submarines: A Critical Analysis

September 09, 2025Tourism1705
Why Didnt the USN Put MK 13 Torpedoes on Submarines When the Mark 14 W

Why Didn't the USN Put MK 13 Torpedoes on Submarines When the Mark 14 Was Problematic?

The decision not to equip US Navy submarines with the MK 13 Torpedoes did not arise from a refusal to recognize any issues with the MK 14 Torpedoes. Instead, it was a complex combination of engineering challenges and bureaucratic resistance.

Engineering Constraints

A significant factor in the non-integration of MK 13 Torpedoes with submarines was the physical dimension discrepancy. The MK 13 Torpedoes had a body diameter of 22.5 inches, whereas the submarine torpedo tubes were 21 inches in diameter. This mismatch meant that the MK 13 Torpedoes would not fit into the submarine tubes, rendering them unsuitable for submarine deployment.

Bureaucratic Resistance and Testing Experiences

Beyond the purely technical challenges, there was also a substantial bureaucratic barrier. The US Navy Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd), a key decision-making body, exhibited a resistance to acknowledging any issues with the MK 14 Torpedoes. Given that neither the submariners nor the aviators were confident in the reliability of the MK 14, and these concerns persistently went unheeded, it was difficult to convince them to consider a different torpedo. The MK 14 was believed by many at the time to be the best torpedo in the world, with US submarines already equipped with it.

Analysis of MK 13 Torpedo Performance

Further complicating matters was the inherent issues with the MK 13 Torpedoes themselves. An analysis in mid-1943 of 105 torpedoes launched at speeds greater than 150 knots revealed a concerning pattern of performance failures. Specifically:

36% experienced cold running issues. 20% sank improperly or failed to achieve depth. 20% had poor deflection performance. 18% provided unsatisfactory depth performance. 2% surfaced unexpectedly. Only 31% performed satisfactorily.

This data, as documented in the US Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II [Chapter 6], highlighted the unreliability of the MK 13 Torpedoes and further underscored the need for rigorous testing and validation.

Conclusion: Lessons Learned

The story of MK 13 Torpedoes and the challenges of integrating them into USN submarines during WWII offers valuable insights into the importance of realistic testing and the critical role of maintaining warrior input. The military has learned that testing weapon systems is essential, but equally important is the acknowledgment and resolution of identified issues. This does not come without cost in terms of resources and risk but, as history has shown, the consequences of untested and unreliable weapons on the battlefield can be dire.

For a comprehensive understanding, the detailed analysis by Dracinfel is highly recommended. His thoughts provide a unique and insightful perspective on this critical chapter in naval history.